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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Case No. 920344-CA 
Priority No. 11 
BRENT ZIEGLEMAN, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order denying 
defendant's motion to suppress in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court in and for Juab County, State of Utah, the Honorable George 
E. Ballif, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Was the initial stop of defendant's vehicle 
supported by reasonable suspicion where the trooper making the 
stop estimated that the vehicle was travelling at a speed of 75 
m.p.h., ten m.p.h. over the posted speed limit? A trial court's 
finding of reasonable suspicion is a finding of fact that this 
Court reviews under a clearly erroneous standard of review. 
State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987) (A trial court's 
finding of reasonable suspicion is a finding of fact that will be 
reversed only if it is demonstrated to be clearly erroneous.). 
2. Given that the State concedes that the trooper did 
not have a reasonable suspicion to justify asking defendant 
whether he was carrying any illegal narcotics or weapons, was 
defendant's subsequent consent to search obtained by police 
exploitation of that prior illegality? Although the trial court 
did not conduct an exploitation analysis because it found no 
prior illegality, this Court may nevertheless decide the issue 
based on the undisputed facts contained in the record. Cf.. State 
v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah App. 1990) (even though 
trial court did not expressly resolve voluntariness of consent 
question, remand was unnecessary because the record was 
sufficiently developed below to allow determination of issue on 
appeal based an undisputed facts). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The applicable constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules for a determination of this case are as follows: 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant and his co-defendant, Michael McNaughton1, 
were charged by information with possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in 
1
 Mr, McNaughton has not joined defendant in this 
interlocutory appeal, Br. of Appellant at 4. 
2 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1992) (R. 
1). Both defendants filed motions to suppress, which were denied 
by the trial court following an evidentiary hearing (R. 88-92, 
96-99). Defendant filed a petition for permission to appeal from 
an interlocutory order, and this Court granted defendant's 
petition (R. 103-04). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, the 
arresting officer, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Lance Bushnell, 
was the only witness called to testify. Following the hearing, 
the trial court entered a signed memorandum decision, and later, 
the trial court entered additional findings of fact and 
conclusions of law (R. 88-92, 96-99). (Copies of the trial 
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law as well as its 
memorandum decision are attached hereto as Addendum A and 
Addendum B, respectively.) The following statement of facts is 
based on the trial court's findings, and, where appropriate, a 
more detailed account of the facts is provided based on the 
uncontroverted testimony of Trooper Bushnell. 
On July 20, 1991, Trooper Lance Bushnell, a four year 
veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol who was certified at 
estimating the speeds of motor vehicles, observed a car 
travelling in the opposite direction on 1-15 near Nephi (R. 147-
150). Bushnell estimated that the vehicle was travelling at a 
speed of approximately 75 m.p.h., ten m.p.h. over the posted 
speed limit (R. 150). 
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Because the radar gun he was using that day did not 
have the capacity to determine the speed of cars going the 
opposite direction across the median, Bushnell decided to cross 
the median and pace the vehicle from behind. Although he allowed 
the vehicle to drive further down the road before he crossed the 
freeway, defendant — who was driving the car — apparently saw 
Bushnell cross the median because when Bushnell caught up to the 
car it had slowed down to 60 m.p.h. — 5 m.p.h. under the posted 
speed limit (R. 150-51, 167-69). 
Bushnell was not able to verify defendant's speed 
either by pacing or with a radar gun (169). He therefore decided 
to simply warn defendant to slow down (R. 152, 162-65). 
Bushnell's decision was in keeping with his policy of issuing 
only a warning instead of a speeding citation in cases in which 
he was unable to verify his visual estimate of a vehicle's speed 
(R. 166). In the instant case, Bushnell decided to give 
defendant a hand signal to keep his speed down (151-52, 171). 
Bushnell pulled along side the vehicle, but neither 
defendant nor his passenger would look at Bushnell. Unable to 
convey a hand signal, Bushnell fell back behind the vehicle and 
then pulled along side the car one more time to try and attract 
the attention of the driver or the passenger (R. 152, 171). 
Again, neither the driver nor the passenger would look toward the 
trooper (R. 171). 
After making two unsuccessful attempts to issue 
defendant an informal warning to slow down via a hand signal, 
4 
Bushnell stopped the vehicle to issue a warning citation (R. 
152). Upon stopping the vehicle, the trooper approached 
defendant and asked for a driver's license and registration. 
Defendant produced a driver's license, but was unable to produce 
a vehicle registration form. Defendant indicated that he had 
borrowed the car from a friend from Minnesota2 named "Bill," but 
he could provide no other information about the car's owner (152-
53). 
As he searched for the registration form, defendant 
appeared to be extremely nervous. He was moving very quickly and 
his hands were trembling. Defendant eventually found an 
insurance information form with the name "William Kayler" upon 
it, which he gave to the trooper (152-55). 
Bushnell began to suspect that the car may have been a 
stolen vehicle because of defendant's inability to produce a 
proper vehicle registration form as well as his inability to 
provide a full name of the vehicle's owner or any other 
information about the owner. Defendant's highly nervous 
behavior, which Bushnell indicated was much greater than that 
typically exhibited by other drivers stopped for traffic 
violations, served to reinforce Bushnell's suspicion that 
something was awry (R. 153, 172-72). Under these circumstances, 
Bushnell decided to request an N.C.I.C. check on the vehicle to 
see if it had been reported stolen (R. 179). 
The report came back negative and indicated that the 
2
 The car carried Minnesota license plates (R. 152). 
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vehicle was owned by a person named "William Kayler," the same 
name that appeared on the insurance form that defendant found in 
the vehicle (R. 178). However, Bushnell testified that stolen 
vehicles are not always promptly listed as having been reported 
stolen. Indeed, although he did not know how long it typically 
took officials in Minnesota to post a stolen vehicle report, 
Bushnell testified that in California it takes two days for such 
a report to be filed (R. 178-80). Moreover, Bushnell had 
personally recovered stolen cars on other occasions — even 
though N.C.I.C. checks had failed to indicate that the vehicle 
had been reported stolen (R. 205).3 
Bushnell returned to the vehicle and asked defendant 
where they had been and where they were going. Defendant 
answered that they had been to California and were going back 
home to Minnesota (153-54). Bushnell then asked if there were 
any weapons or narcotics in the vehicle. Defendant said that he 
had no knowledge about anything of that sort being in the vehicle 
(R. 154). Bushnell followed up his question by asking M[d]o you 
3
 The record is less than clear on the question of exactly 
when Bushnell ran the N.C.I.C. check and whether he had received 
the results before he asked defendant for consent to search the 
vehicle. Indeed, in its initial ruling the trial court indicated 
only that "[i]t is unclear from the facts whether the officer 
asked for consent to search the car while he was waiting for the 
results of NCIC, or whether he had already learned the car was 
not listed as stolen when he asked for consent" (R. 90). 
Nevertheless, based on its subsequently entered findings of fact, 
it appears that the trial court determined that Bushnell knew the 
results of the check before he asked for consent to search (R. 
98). Because of the ambiguity in the record, it cannot be said 
that the trial court's finding is clearly erroneous. 
6 
mind if we* look?" The trial court found that defendant 
"unhesitatingly replied[,] 'help yourself" (R. 98), and 
defendant got out of the car (R. 155). 
Bushnell then asked the passenger, co-defendant 
McNaughton, to get out of the vehicle. McNaughton got out of the 
car and stood behind it with defendant, out of the lane of 
traffic (R. 155). 
As McNaughton exited the vehicle, Bushnell asked him 
his name. McNaughton "just grabbed his wallet and started 
digging through his wallet" (R. 155). McNaughton's hands were 
visibly shaking as he passed over his driver's license three 
separate times. Bushnell finally stopped McNaughton and said, 
"[ijsn't that [your driver's license] right there?" (R. 156). 
McNaughton quickly reached for his license and tried to remove it 
from his wallet. However, because he was moving so quickly and 
shaking so badly, McNaughton spilled all the contents of his 
wallet onto the ground. Bushnell asked McNaughton why he was so 
nervous and McNaughton responded that he was nervous because he 
didn't come in contact with the police very often (156). 
Bushnell testified that McNaughton's extreme nervousness served 
to further reinforce his suspicion that the two men had stolen 
the vehicle (R. 182). 
As Bushnell began to search the vehicle, he immediately 
found a package of "Zig Zag" rolling papers inside a Nike court 
A
 By "we" Trooper Bushnell was referring to himself and 
Deputy Bill Thompkins, who was riding with Bushnell (R. 155). 
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shoe in the back seat (R. 156-57). Bushnell stated that such 
papers are typically used to roll marijuana cigarettes, but that 
they can also be used for rolling tobacco. However, the trooper 
found neither tobacco nor marijuana in the vehicle (R. 188-89). 
Bushnell asked both men if they owned the papers, but neither of 
the two claimed ownership (R. 157). 
The trooper could not understand why neither would 
admit to owning the rolling papers because it is not illegal to 
possess such papers (R. 157, 190). The denial of ownership, 
coupled with the driver's inability to produce a vehicle 
registration form or to identify the owner of the vehicle beyond 
stating that his name was "Bill," as well as the extreme 
nervousness of both defendant and his companion, caused Bushnell 
to suspect not only that the vehicle was stolen, but also that 
the two might be transporting illegal narcotics. According to 
Bushnell, the latter suspicion was also based in part on his 
having previously encountered — in about 30 percent of his 
prior felony narcotics arrests — drug traffickers who were 
travelling in a vehicle that was either stolen or had been loaned 
to them by a third party (R. 177, 193-95). 
Bushnell then searched the trunk of the vehicle, but he 
found nothing of consequence. He also asked defendant if he 
could look in a duffel bag that was in the trunk, and defendant 
said "[g]o ahead" (R. 157). Again, the trooper found no 
contraband (R. 157). 
Bushnell then searched under the hood of the car. 
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There he saw an oil cloth wedged between the battery and interior 
wall of the right front fender. Bushnell felt the cloth and 
could tell that it contained something that felt like a brick of 
narcotics like he had seized on other occasions (R. 157-60, 192-
93). Further inspection revealed that the cloth covered a brown 
grocery bag that contained a kilogram of cocaine (R. 160-61). 
Defendant and McNaughton were then arrested and charged 
with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute (R. 159). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant was initially the subject of a routine 
traffic stop for speeding. Bushnell estimated that defendant's 
vehicle was travelling at a rate of approximately 75 m.p.h., and 
he stopped defendant's vehicle to issue a warning citation after 
he was unable to simply warn the driver to slow down via a hand 
signal. The initial stop was therefore proper because it was 
supported by a reasonable suspicion that defendant had exceeded 
the posted speed limit. 
However, Bushnell exceeded the scope of detention 
permitted for a routine traffic stop when he asked defendant 
whether there were any weapons or narcotics in the vehicle. 
Because Bushnell had no basis to suspect defendant was engaged in 
criminal activity involving weapons or narcotics, the State 
concedes that the trooper's inquiry and the attendant detention 
were impermissible. 
Given this prior illegality, the validity of 
defendant's consent to search must be analyzed under the two-
9 
pronged Arroyo test. Defendant has never challenged the validity 
of his consent based on the "voluntariness" prong, and the trial 
court found that defendant unhesitatingly replied "help yourself" 
when Bushnell sought his consent to search the vehicle. Because 
defendant does not challenge that finding, the first prong of 
Arroyo is not at issue in this case. 
Defendant does argue that his consent was tainted by 
the prior illegality, and that the evidence seized in the 
subsequent search must therefore be suppressed. Defendant's 
argument must fail because his consent was not obtained by 
exploitation of the illegal detention. 
As the Utah Supreme Court recently made clear in State 
v. Thurman, No. 910494 (Utah January 7, 1993), the policy 
objective underlying the attenuation analysis is deterrence of 
police misconduct. Because the issue of whether an officer, in 
the course of a routine traffic stop, could ask the question 
posed by Bushnell had not been addressed by Utah's appellate 
courts at the time of this incident, Bushnell's action cannot be 
deemed a flagrant act of misconduct or an egregious violation of 
the law. This Court should therefore uphold the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion to suppress on the ground that 
defendant's consent to search was not obtained by police 
exploitation of a prior illegality and is therefore valid. 
X0 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INITIAL TRAFFIC STOP OF DEFENDANT WAS 
JUSTIFIED BECAUSE BUSHNELL HAD OBSERVED 
DEFENDANT TRAVELLING AT A SPEED OF 
APPROXIMATELY 75 M.P.H., TEN M.P.H. OVER THE 
POSTED SPEED LIMIT. 
The trial court's finding that the initial stop of 
defendant to issue a warning for speeding was supported by 
reasonable suspicion is not clearly erroneous.5 This Court 
should therefore uphold the trial court's finding that the 
initial stop of defendant was valid. 
A review of the record demonstrates, and the trial 
court expressly found, that Bushnell visually estimated the speed 
of defendant's vehicle to be 75 m.p.h., which was well in excess 
of the posted speed limit. Numerous decisions from Utah's 
appellate courts make clear that "as long as an officer suspects 
the driver is violating 'any one of the multitude of applicable 
traffic and equipment regulations,' the police officer may 
legally stop the vehicle." State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883 
n.3 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990) 
(citation omitted) (stop to issue a warning citation for leaving 
5
 The State recognizes that there has been an ongoing dialog 
among members of this Court concerning the appropriate standard 
of review to apply in various settings and that the Utah Supreme 
Court in Thurman, No. 910494 slip op. at 21., adopted a 
bifurcated standard of review for determinations of voluntariness 
of consent and attenuation from a prior illegality. However, 
until the Utah Supreme Court expressly overrules it express 
holding in Mendoza, 748 P.2d at 183, that reasonable suspicion is 
a finding of fact reviewed for clear error, this Court must 
continue to apply a clearly erroneous standard of review when 
reviewing a trial court's finding of reasonable suspicion. 
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left blinker on for two miles was valid). See also State v. 
Sepulveda, 200 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 2, 74 (Utah App. November 19, 
1992) (stop for expired registration sticker was valid); State v. 
Lovearen, 798 P.2d 767 (Utah App. 1990) (stopping defendant for 
following too closely and for not wearing seat belts was valid); 
State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 702 (Utah App. 1992) (stop for 
speeding was valid); United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 815, 
reh'q denied, 941 F.2d 1086 (10th Cir. 1991) (stop for speeding 
was valid). 
Bushnell is certified at estimating vehicle speeds to 
within five miles per hour. However, he was unable to confirm 
that speed either by pacing or by radar. In keeping with his 
personal policy in such situations, Bushnell decided to simply 
warn defendant to slow down. Initially, Bushnell attempted to 
warn defendant by pulling along side the vehicle and using a hand 
signal. Because neither defendant nor his passenger would look 
at him, Bushnell was unable to convey that warning. 
Consequently, Bushnell stopped defendant with the intent to tell 
defendant "to slow down and [to] let [him] go" after issuing that 
warning (R. 176) . 
The trial court recognized all of these factors in its 
findings: 
1. On July 20, 1991, on 1-15 within 
Juab County, Utah, Trooper Lance Bushnell, a 
four year veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol, 
observed a motor vehicle in the area of 
Nephi, and visually estimated the speed to be 
in excess of 70 m.p.h., approximately 75 
m.p.h., but was unable to obtain a radar 
reading on the vehicle. The officer had 
12 
received training and certification in 
estimating speeds. 
2. The officer turned and followed the 
vehicle to obtain a paced speed, but the 
vehicle had slowed and was now travelling 60 
m.p.h.. He then pulled alongside the vehicle 
with the intent of giving the driver a hand 
signal to slow down. Neither the driver nor 
the passenger would look towards him so he 
could signal them to slow down. The officer 
then stopped the vehicle with the intent of 
giving the driver a warning concerning his 
speed. 
(R. 97). 
The trooper's testimony that defendant was speeding was 
uncontroverted. Consequently, despite defendant's protestations 
that "the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion to believe 
defendant had committed a crime" (Br. of Appellant at 8), the 
trial court's finding that the initial stop of defendant was 
supported by reasonable suspicion should be upheld. See Castner, 
825 P.2d at 702 (stop for speeding was valid). 
POINT II 
THE STATE CONCEDES THAT TROOPER BUSHNELL 
EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF DETENTION PERMISSIBLE 
DURING A ROUTINE TRAFFIC STOP BY ASKING 
DEFENDANT WHETHER THERE WERE ANY WEAPONS OR 
NARCOTICS IN THE VEHICLE AND THAT THE OFFICER 
LACKED THE REQUISITE REASONABLE SUSPICION TO 
JUSTIFY MAKING THAT INQUIRY. 
This Court discussed the fourth amendment parameters 
for routine traffic stops in State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 
(Utah App. 1990). As explained in Robinson: 
An officer conducting a routine traffic 
stop may request a driver's license and 
vehicle registration, conduct a computer 
check, and issue a citation. United States 
v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 
13 
1988), However, once the driver has produced 
a valid license and evidence of entitlement 
to use the vehicle, "he must be allowed to 
proceed on his way, without being subject to 
further delay by police for additional 
questioning." JTd. Any further temporary 
detention for investigative questioning after 
the fulfillment of the purpose for the 
initial traffic stop is justified under the 
fourth amendment only if the detaining 
officer has a reasonable suspicion of serious 
criminal activity. Ld.; United States v. 
Walker, [933 F.2d 812, reh'q denied, 941 F.2d 
1086 (10th Cir. 1991)]. The detaining 
officers must be able to articulate a 
particularized and objective basis for their 
suspicions that is drawn from the totality of 
circumstances facing them at the time of the 
seizure. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 
411, 417-18, 101 S. Ct. 690, 694-95, 66 
L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); see State v. Mendoza, 748 
P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987) . 
Robinson, 797 P.2d at 435. 
In the instant case, Bushnell detained the driver to 
run a N.C.I.C. check to see whether the vehicle was stolen. This 
action was within the proper scope of the traffic stop because 
defendant failed to produce a vehicle registration form or 
evidence of entitlement to use of vehicle. Consequently, to the 
extent that the trooper detained defendant in order to verify 
that defendant's use of the vehicle was permissive, the detention 
was proper. 
However, under this Court's recent decision in State v. 
Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 654 (Utah App. 1992), when the trooper 
asked defendant whether there were any weapons or narcotics in 
the vehicle, he exceeded the scope of detention permitted for a 
routine traffic stop. Therefore, in order for the attendant 
detention to be valid, Bushnell had to have a reasonable 
14 
suspicion of other criminal activity. 
The "reasonable suspicion" test was first articulated 
by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). There the Court held that when "a police 
officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to 
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity is 
afoot • • • ," he may make an investigative stop to confirm or 
dispel his suspicion, Terry, 88 S. Ct. at 1884. The Court also 
has noted that "[t]he concept of reasonable suspicion, like 
probable cause, is not 'readily or even usefully, reduced to a 
neat set of legal rules.'" United States v. Sokolow, U.S. 
, 190 S. Ct. 1581, 1588 (1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 232, 103 S. Ct. 2317, (1983)). Finally, in United 
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 
(1981), the Court held that the existence of reasonable suspicion 
is to be determined based on the totality of the circumstances. 
This Court has adopted these standards. See, e.g., Godina-Luna, 
826 P.2d at 654-55; Robinson, 797 P.2d at 435; State v. Holmes, 
774 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 
941 (Utah App. 1988) . 
There is abundant evidence in the record to support a 
finding that the trooper reasonably suspected that the vehicle 
was stolen, and he could have properly continued to investigate 
that possibility. However, Bushnell's questioning of defendant 
about weapons and narcotics was unrelated to the issue of whether 
the vehicle was stolen. The question shifted the scope of the 
15 
detention to the issue of whether defendant was transporting 
illegal drugs or weapons. 
Under these circumstances, Bushnell had to have a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity involving illegal drugs 
or weapons to support the continued detention* The totality of 
the facts known to Bushnell at that point in his investigation, 
namely that defendant could not produce evidence of his 
entitlement to use the vehicle or identify the owner by his full 
name and the extremely high level of nervousness exhibited by the 
two men, cannot support a finding of the requisite reasonable 
suspicion mandated by Godina-Luna. The State therefore concedes 
that the continued detention of defendant violated the fourth 
amendment. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S CONSENT TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE WAS 
VALID UNDER STATE V, THURMAN. 
Even though the investigative detention of defendant 
was illegal because it was not supported by a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity involving drugs or weapons, the 
search of defendant's vehicle can still be sanctioned if 
defendant's consent to that search was valid,6 Under State v. 
6
 As a threshold matter, the State concedes on appeal that 
defendant has standing to challenge the search of the vehicle. 
Defendant claimed that he had borrowed the car from a friend 
named "Bill," and it appears from the record that Bushnell later 
confirmed that defendant was in possession of the vehicle with 
the owner's consent (R. 152, 181),, Despite the trial court's 
contrary determination, these facts adequately demonstrate that 
defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle. 
Cf. Robinson, 797 P.2d at 437 n.6 (defendant's uncontested 
(continued...) 
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Arroyo, 796 P.zet f»t.<4 , (JH8 (Ulan jyyO), tnc iuquji> m m WTIH-T lu I . 
consent to search is lawfully obtained following illegal police 
action ii/i ist focus on two factors: (1) whether the consent was 
voluntary, and (2) whether the consent wab obtained by police 
exploitation of the prior Illegality. 
T j i e v a l i d i t y Q£ defendant's consent 
under the voluntariness prong of 
Arroyo is not at issue in this 
case. 
Defendant has never contended that his consent w-db ".,i 
given voluntarily. Indeed, ii: :-• signed memorandum decision, 
t • . » • ; ; ' -' "- •- '-i-1 : • lot alleged any 
police coercion c: duress, but claim[s] the search Is Invalid 
under *- f- * 4 the poisonous tree' analysis" (R. 90). 
Likewx— -. •- - y . - . , """the consent to 
search was given under circumstances that cannot be separated 
from [the prior illegality]. The consent to search was 
[ theref ore ] i ] ] ega ] 1 > obta i i Iei ill, a n ci 11 Ie evi d e n c e mi i s t b e 
suppressed." Br. of Appellant at 31 
Given Trooper Bushnell's uncontroverted testimony, and 
the trial court's finding 11 i a t < Ie f e i id a 111 "  1111 h e s :i. t: a 11 n g 1 y r e v "J n t;,»c j 
'help yourself when Bushnell requested consent to search the 
vehicle (F "iBj, defendant i decision not * challenge the 
validity of his consent ..•• - he < "OJuntra ss prong of Arroyo 
6(•..continued) 
testimony that he had been given permission by the owner to take 
the van that he was driving on a two-week vacation was sufficient 
to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the van's 
interior). 
i / 
is well measured. Cf.. Sepulveda, 200 Utah Adv. Rep. at 75 
(officer's uncontroverted testimony demonstrated defendant 
voluntarily consented to search of his vehicle). Defendant does, 
however, challenge the validity of his consent on the ground that 
it was not sufficiently attenuated from the prior illegality.7 
2. Arroyo's exploitation prong as 
clarified in State v. Thurman. 
Before analyzing the issue of whether defendant's 
consent to search was sufficiently attenuated from the prior 
illegality, a discussion of the parameters of Arroyo's 
"exploitation" prong is in order. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently clarified the analysis 
to be conducted under the exploitation (or attenuation) prong of 
Arroyo. State v. Thurman, No. 910494, slip op. at 7-11 (Utah 
January 7, 1993). Significantly, the Court began its discussion 
of the exploitation prong with an unequivocal statement of the 
policy consideration that underlies Arroyo: 
Arroyo's primary goal was to deter the police 
from engaging in illegal conduct even though 
that conduct may be followed by a voluntary 
consent to the subsequent search. 
7
 Because the trial court found that there was no prior 
illegality, it did not specifically consider the issue of whether 
defendant's consent was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal 
detention. While it is generally appropriate to remand the case 
to the trial court for the entry of additional findings in such 
instances, that is not necessary in the instant case because 
there are no disputed facts. ££. Robinson, 797 P.2d at 437 (even 
though trial court did not expressly resolve voluntariness of 
consent question, remand was unnecessary because the record was 
sufficiently developed to allow determination of issue on appeal 
based on undisputed facts). Consequently, this Court may review 
the facts developed below to determine whether defendant's 
consent was valid under the exploitation prong of Arroyo. 
18 
The deterrence rationale discussed 
Arroyo is grounded in the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. 
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). There, 
Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion 
joined by now Chief Justice Rehnquist, made 
it clear that the analysis used to invalidate 
consent on the basis of exploitation was 
grounded firmly in the deterrent purposes i)f 
the exclusionary rule. Id. at 608-12. 
Justice Powell's admonition that the 
exploitation analysis "always should be 
conducted with the deterrent purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule sharply in 
focus," id. at 612, has become a cornerstone 
of search and seizure jurisprudence. See 4 
Search & Seizure § 1 ] 4 ( a ) , at 373: see also 
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and 
Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
378, 390 (1964) [hereinafter Amsterdam]. 
Thurman, No 910494, slip op. at 8-9. 
Having identified the deter reii l. puipose nt the 
exclusionary rule as the underpinning of the Arroyo exploitation 
prong, the Thurman Court reiterated the factors - re ^onsidered 
by courts: " [ 1) ] 'the purpose and flagra... 
misconduct," [ 2 ) | the 'temporal proximity' of * *• .legality and 
the consen ti ami, I :j t I "the presence of intervening 
circumstances.'" .Id., at 9 (citations omitted). The Thurman 
Court then discussed each factor in greater detail, emphasizing 
t Lu^e throughout its 
discussion. 
Clearly, the "purpose and flagrancy" factor is the most 
signi f ,1 cani m I In 'iiiiee he - *r ! . y related to the 
deterrent value of suppression." . .stations omitted). 
As such,- the first task a court must complete under the 
e x p 1 o i t a t i c i I p i c > 11», j i f •« 1.»'.» c*"' h a i a c 1. e r i z e 11 i e n a 11 11: e a i I ci • i e g i: e e o f 
Ji y 
the prior illegality based on a continuum of "flagrancy" and 
"egregiousness." 
To put the continuum into perspective, it must first be 
recognized that "'[t]he deterrent purpose of the exclusionary 
rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, 
or at the very least negligent, conduct which [sic] has deprived 
the defendant of some right. '" Id,. (quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 
612 (Powell, J., concurring) in turn quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 
417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)). Consequently, at one end of the 
continuum falls police misconduct that is "flagrantly abusive, 
[such that] there is a greater likelihood that the police engaged 
in the conduct as a pretext for collateral objectives," or 
instances in which "the purpose of the misconduct was to achieve 
the consent[.]" Id., (citations omitted). In such cases, 
"suppressing the resulting evidence will have a greater 
likelihood of deterring similar misconduct in the future." Id. 
(footnote and citation omitted). 
At the other end of the continuum lies instances in 
which "the police had no 'purpose' in engaging in the 
misconduct[.] [F]or example, if the illegality arose because [a 
court] later invalidated a statute on which the police had relied 
in good faith—suppression would have no deterrent value." Id. 
(citations omitted). 
Thurman then describes the relationship between the 
other two factors, temporal proximity and intervening 
circumstances, and the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary 
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rule Specifically, •'[t]he deterrent value of suppressing 
e- -• ^*:.:e seized f 1 lowing poJicti illegal.! ty is negligible where 
the subsequent consent to search is substantially separated 
either temporally or circumstantially from that illegality," Id. 
Although Arroyo may not have been clear on this point, 
Thurman unmistakably holds that "the exploitation analysis 
requires a La lancing ".,"1 the relative egregi ousness of the 
misconduct against the time and circumstances that intervene 
before the consent is given." Thurman, slip op. at 10 (emphasis 
added) Moreover, 
[t]he nature and degree of the illegality 
will usually be inversely related to the 
effectiveness of time and intervening events 
to dissipate the presumed taint. Where the 
misconduct is extreme, we will require a 
clean break in the chain of events between 
the misconduct and the consent to find the 
consent valid. . . . Conversely, where it 
appears that the illegality arose as the 
result of negligence, the lapse of time 
between the misconduct and the consent and 
the presence of intervening events become 
• less critical to the dissipation of the 
taint. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
Thurmai i s i z:] arificati on of how the nature and degree of 
the illegality is balanced against the intervening time and 
circumstances stands marked contrast c trls Court's analysis 
ci I 1 !H-J e x p 11' I I a t in i u in i w.uc :.:.._ • 2 d 4 5 6 ( U t a h 
App.)/ cert, denied, , : ':-• c*r ^ and State v. Sims, 
808 P. 2d 14 J (Utah App.,, L ^ - . pending, : 't ah Adv. Rep. 9 
( . r 4 , J 9 "J I ) . 
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In both Park and Sims, the defendants gave consent to 
search their vehicles after being detained at police roadblocks, 
which were later deemed to be illegal• At the time the 
roadblocks were set up, however, no decision from either Utah's 
appellate courts or the United States Supreme Court had directly 
ruled on the legality of such roadblocks. See generally Sims, 
808 P.2d at 142-50. Thus, the roadblocks could not be fairly 
characterized as flagrant violations of the fourth amendment or 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, even though this 
Court ultimately concluded that the roadblocks violated those 
provisions. 
In concluding that the defendant's "consent to search 
his vehicle was arrived at by exploitation of the illegal 
roadblock," the Sims panel relied most heavily on two factors: 
(1) "the consent was obtained within minutes of the illegal stop, 
and not even under our clear error standard of review could the 
trial court find enough time between the stop and the grant of 
consent to attenuate the relationship between the two;" and (2) 
"the record reveal[ed] [no] possibility of intervening 
circumstances between the illegal stop and [the defendant's] 
grant of consent to the search[.]" Sims, 808 P.2d at 150-51 
(emphasis added). An identical approach was followed by the Park 
panel in reversing the trial court's denial of the defendant's 
motion to suppress. Park, 810 P.2d at 458-59. 
Given Arroyo's ambiguous discussion of the exploitation 
prong, it was not unreasonable for this Court in Sims and Park to 
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j nterpret Arrays ao requiring a clean break In the chain of 
events between * nrio: 1. leycilily rim I .subsequent consent in order 
for that consent r te deemed valid. 
Under the analytical framework utilized by the panels 
in Sims and Park, the : ; t^ 
defendant's consent i search was *• .-r sufficiently attenuated 
froiTi the prior il]e~; ' *:\ '- - ?r. ~h*- consent w^ « therefore 
invalid, Thurman, however, clear! J • ^ - * -.ework. 
Indeed, under Thurman defendant's consent should be deemed valid. 
T2ie inegaiity that occurred in 
this case was not egregious because 
at the time that Bushnell asked 
defendant whether there were any 
weapons or narcotics in his vehicle 
the issue of whether an officer, in 
the course of a routine traffic 
stop, could ask that question had 
not been addressed by Utah's 
appellate courts. 
Recognizing that the poll cy underlying Arroyo is t, h« 
deterrent value < • the exclusionary rule, suppression would be 
inappr upr i a t. e j t;• a u»: > I:ie c a 11 s e P V PII t• h o 11 q h Bushne 11 exceeded 
the permissible scope of detention, his actions do not constitute 
flagrant misconduct or an egregious violation of the? law 
Tl lis CouT t i I in G o d i n a - L u n a :iiMii*-' C I ea i that arm o f f i c e r , 
as part of a routine traffic stop, may not legally ask the 
question regarding narcotics and weapons *rn, Bushnell asked in 
this case, Ht% it tin? tini^  th,^ B^ h .• - -  defendant, 
Utah courts had ; resolved that issue, and other courts were 
divided. The Tenth Circuit Court t Appeals? ! r example, had 
issued inconsistent panel > -
In United States v. Walravenf 892 F.2d 972, 976 (10th 
Cir. 1989), and United States v. Diaz-Albertini, 772 F.2d 654, 
659 (10th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 822 (1987), the 
panels held that such questions, even though unsupported by 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, were permissible 
during a routine traffic stop. On the other hand, in United 
States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 814-16 (10th Cir. 1991), the 
panel held that extended detention of the defendant to ask such 
questions, unsupported by reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity, violated the fourth amendment. See also United States 
v. Werkinq, 915 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. 
Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988). However, the Walker 
panel dropped the following footnote in its opinion: 
Under the reasoning of United States v. 
Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200 (10th Cir. 
1990), our determination that defendant was 
unlawfully detained might be different if the 
questioning by the officer did not delay the 
stop beyond the measure of time necessary to 
issue a citation. For example, this case 
would be significantly changed if the officer 
asked the same questions while awaiting the 
results of an NCIC license of registration 
inquiry. 
933 F.2d at 816 n.2. 
In this case, Bushnell could have detained defendant to 
further investigate defendant's failure to produce a vehicle 
registration form or other evidence of his entitlement to use the 
vehicle. Cf.. Robinson, 797 P.2d at 435 (once a driver has 
produced evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, he must be 
allowed to proceed, without being subject to further delay by 
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police for additional questioning). L'orusequenLly, under Walker, 
Bushnell's conduct was arguably permissible because it did not 
delay r. fie si, ).,« beyond the time necessary to investigate the issue 
of whether defendant had permissive use c: £ the vehicle 8 
Two contemporaneous decisions from the California 
courts reflect a split similar LO tha- evidenced , ".he decisions 
from the Tenth Circuit Court of Apoee . ;~ .t-.-r.-- -;. ive Compare 
People v. Lusardi, 228 Cal.App.3d Supp. .b ;al .Rptr. 80, 81 
(Cal. Super ] 9"-f'i > | "'of f i cers making a proper traffic [stop] 
cannot, on mere hunch, properly ask for consent to searchf;] the 
consent obtained .- vitiated because the detention is unlawfully 
cent iJKif'J of tftT t ,: • '.rpose has passed 
People v. Galindo, 229 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1529, 281 CaJ,K{' 
158 (Cal. App. 199: officer's post-citation inquiry of 
d . - : > - .* . ' i ••'•- * ••••• •••*'• :.." - o r a x u y s 
in the car and request for permission to search car was 
proper). 
U • * - - 'o 
address the issue of whether it was permissible for aii officer, 
in the course of a routine traffic stop tc — ?• ~ht. question 
posed liy Bufahne] 1 C.IIIH,! MI light, \>t MJI a . , . . m 
other courts on the issue presented, cannot W -;; :.• the 
8
 Indeed, since the time of the stop that occurred here, 
this Court has similarly recognized that the "running of a 
warrants check in the course of a traffic stop is permissible, so 
long as i t does not significantly extend the period of detention 
beyond that reasonably necessary to effectuate the original 
purpose of the stop." State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 
280 (Utah App. 1992) • 
trooper's asking defendant whether there were any weapons or 
narcotics in the vehicle constituted flagrant misconduct or an 
egregious violation of the law. Because the trooper's conduct in 
this case was not clearly illegal — and was indeed arguably 
proper — at the time of the encounter, no deterrent value would 
be served by suppressing the evidence seized. 
This case is akin to one in which "the illegality arose 
because [a court] later invalidated a statute on which the police 
had relied in good faith[;] suppression would [therefore] have no 
deterrent value." Thurman, slip op. at 9 (citation omitted). 
Consequently, although the record indicates that there was no 
temporal break or intervening circumstance between the asking of 
the improper question and defendant's consent to search, this 
Court should uphold defendant's consent to search under the 
exploitation analysis articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Thurman. 
To summarize briefly, the stop of defendant's vehicle 
to issue a warning for speeding was proper because Trooper 
Bushnell had estimated the speed of defendant's vehicle to be 10 
m.p.h. over the posted speed limit. Although the trooper could 
have properly continued to detain defendant to verify defendant's 
entitlement to use the vehicle, he exceeded the scope of 
detention permitted for a routine traffic stop when he asked 
defendant whether there were any weapons or narcotics in the 
vehicle. However, the trooper's conduct was arguably proper 
under the law as it then existed. Under Arroyo, as recently 
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clarified .by the Utah Supreme Court in Thurman, defendant s 
consent to search was no 1: Dbta.ined b;} po 1 i ce exp] oi 1:at :i on o£ a 
prior illegality and Is therefore valid. 
CONCLUSION 
For the forego j ng reasons, 1 hi'i C'MIJI t shorn H riff inn 1 In 
trial court" s denial of defendant's motion to suppress. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3,7*^ day of January, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney Genera1 
TODD A. UTZTOGER* 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 iereby certify that s * rue and accurate copy of the 
: . i »r _. . g t ; . ~ . . . r- .:. it ., postage prepaid, 
Andrew McCullough, attorney for appellant, 930 South State 
Street, Suite 10, Orem, Utah 84058, this day ui January, 
1993. 
Q*4/a. 
*r?*-
27 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Donald J. Eyre Jr., No. 1021 
Juab County Attorney 
125 North Main Street 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: 623-1141 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. : 
Criminal No. 82-E 
BRENT ZIEGLEMAN and : 
MICHAEL McNAUGHTON, 
Defendants. : 
The above entitled matter came before the Court for hearing 
upon the defendant's Motion to Suppress on November 15, 1991. The 
defendant, Brent Ziegleman, was present and represented by his 
attorney, W. Andrew McCullough, and the defendant, Michael 
McNaughton, was present and represented by his attorney, Milton T. 
Harmon. The State of Utah was represented by Donald J. Eyre Jr., 
Juab County Attorney. 
The Court having heard the evidence introduced by both the 
State of Utah and the defendants and having reviewed the Memorandum 
of Law submitted by the parties and being fully advised in the 
premises and the Court having previously entered its Ruling dated 
1 
:! District Ceuu, iuz-j t'ur.i 
r i L 2 D 
January 14, 1992, now makes the following: 
WNMWS OF FACT 
1. On July 20, 1991 on 1-15 within Juab County, Utah, Trooper 
Lance Bushnell, a four year veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol, 
observed a motor vehicle in the area of Nephi, and visually 
estimated the speed to be in excess of 70 m.p.h., approximately 75 
m.p.h., but was unable to obtain a radar reading on the vehicle. 
The officer had received training and certification in estimating 
of speeds. 
2. The officer turned and followed the vehicle to obtain a 
paced speed, but the vehicle had slowed and was now traveling 60 
m.p.h.. He then pulled alongside the vehicle with the intent of 
giving the driver a hand signal to slow down. Neither the driver 
nor the passenger would look towards him so he could signal them 
to slow down. The officer then stopped the vehicle with the intent 
of giving the driver a warning concerning his speeding. 
3. The driver of the vehicle was the defendant, Brent Lee 
Ziegleman, with one other passenger in the vehicle, the defendant, 
Michael McNaughton. 
4. Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer approached the 
driver and asked for a driverfs license and registration. The 
driver produced a driver's license, but was unable to produce a 
registration. The driver claimed the owner's name was "Bill" and 
2 
f7 
he was a friend and he had borrowed the car, but could give no 
further information concerning his name or where he lived. While 
the driver searched for the registration, he appeared to be 
extremely nervous with the hands trembling. The occupants had no 
written authorization or anything that gave them the right to be 
in possession of the vehicle. 
5. The officer ran the vehicle through the NCIC computer to 
determine if it was reported stolen. The request came back 
negative, but the officer continued to investigate the possibility 
of a stolen vehicle, because of his past experience of finding 
stolen vehicles not listed on NCIC as stolen. 
6. The officer then asked the driver if there were any 
weapons, drugs or narcotics in the vehicle. The driver said there 
was not any. The officer then asked for consent to search, Mr. 
Ziegleman unhesitatingly replied "help yourself". 
7. The officer then searched the interior of the vehicle and 
found nothing of substance. The officer then asked for consent to 
search the trunk, which consent was again given by the driver. 
Again no contraband was found therein. The officer then search the 
hood area. Between the right front fender and the battery was an 
oil cloth covering a brown grocery sack with a kilogram of cocaine 
contained therein. 
8. Both defendants were then arrested for possessing cocaine 
3 
9J 
with the intent to distribute. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The stop of the defendants1 vehicle by Trooper Bushnell 
for speeding based upon his visual estimate was lawful based upon 
reasonable suspicion of a violation of state law. 
2. The continued detention of the defendants after the 
initial stop for speeding, was justified based upon the defendants 
inability to produce a registration for the vehicle or any 
authority to be in possession of the vehicle. 
3. The defendant, Ziegleman, voluntarily consented to a 
search of the vehicle by the officer without any coercion or duress 
by the officer. 
4. Neither defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
to the hood area of the subject vehicle, and therefore did not have 
standing to object to a search of that area of the vehicle. 
5. Both defendants1 Motions to Suppress should be denied. 
Dated this 
-sBistrict Judge P 
4 
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ADDENDUM B 
.. -• Otttrtct Court, Jutb C _umv 
^ FlUD 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * Pat P. Greenwood.Clerk Deputy 
S T A T E OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, Case Number: 82-E 
vs. RULING 
BRENT ZIEGLEMAN AND MICHAEL GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE 
MCNAUGHTON 
Defendants. 
********** 
This matter came before the Court on defendants' motions 
to suppress cocaine, which was found in the hood of a car 
defendants were driving. Defendant Michael John McNaughton filed 
his motion on August 26, 1991 and defendant Brent Ziegleman filed 
his motion on September 6, 1991. 
The Court, having proceeded with an evidentiary hearing and 
also having considered the motions and memoranda, now enters its: 
RULING. 
The Court denies defendants' motions in that the officer 
was justified in making the initial stop of the vehicle, he had a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion sufficient to detain defendants, 
and he obtained a valid consent to search to vehicle. In the event 
that either the initial stop or subsequent detention are flawed, 
then under a fourth amendment search and seizure analysis the issue 
of standing and of a reasonable expectation of privacy would arise. 
However, in this case defendants have not established that they had 
such an expectation, especially in the hood area of the vehicle. 
1. 
2. 
POINT ONE—THE OFFICER WAS JUSTIFIED IN MAKING THE INITIAL STOP 
The Utah courts have held that a police officer may stop 
an automobile for a traffic violation committed in his presence, 
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988), and that an officer 
conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license 
and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a 
citation. State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990). In 
this case the officer, who was certified at estimating the speed of 
vehicles, believed that there had been a speeding violation. He 
testified that he attempted to warn defendants of this, but because 
they would not look at him, he pulled them over to relay this 
warning. 
It should be noted that if defendants' lack of eye contact was 
the cause of the initial stop for speeding, it was only due to the 
fact that the officer had been unable to warn defendant Ziegleman 
about his excessive speed by giving hand signals. This behavior 
did not, in and of itself, lead the officer to believe that there 
was more serious criminal activity going on. Although the officer 
considers nervousness and shifty eye movements as evidencing guilt 
in certain circumstances, those behaviorisms in the later part of 
this investigation only served to reinforce other findings as the 
investigation continued. 
POINT TWO—THE OFFICER WAS JUSTIFIED IN DETAINING DEFENDANTS 
SUBSEQUENT TO THE INITIAL STOP 
In Robinson, the Utah Appellate Court held that once an 
officer has obtained a valid driver's license and evidence of 
3. 
entitlement to use the vehicle, the driver must be allowed to 
proceed on his way. Here the driver, Brent Ziegleman, could not 
produce a registration for the vehicle, and the only entitlement 
to use the car was his claim that his friend "Bill" had loaned him 
the car. He could provide no further information about "Bill." 
In State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987) it was stated 
that an officer may seize or detain a person if the officer has an 
"articulable suspicion" that the person has committed or is about 
to commit a crime. Here, the officer has testified that he 
suspected that the car had been stolen. Therefore, he detained the 
defendants in order that he could check with NCIC to see if the 
car had been stolen. 
POINT THREE—THE OFFICER OBTAINED A VALID CONSENT TO SEARCH THE 
VEHICLE 
It is unclear from the facts whether the officer asked for 
consent to search the car while he was waiting for the results from 
NCIC, or whether he had already learned the car was not listed as 
stolen when he asked for consent. In any event, it is undisputed 
that Ziegleman replied, unhesitatingly, "help yourself." This 
seems to be voluntary consent and, in fact defendants have not 
alleged any police coercion or duress, but claim the search is 
invalid under a "fruit of the poisonous tree" analysis. However, 
the initial stop was valid, the subsequent detention was valid, 
and the contraband was discovered under the hood of the car 
pursuant to a valid consent to a search, and thus it is admissible. 
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POINT FOUR—DEFENDANTS HAVE NO STANDING TO OBJECT TO A SEARCH OF 
THE HOOD AREA 
The foregoing analysis assumes that defendants had standing to 
object to the search, pursuant to a fourth amendment search and 
seizure analysis. However, in the event that the initial stop, the 
subsequent detention or the search were flawed in some manner, the 
issue does arise whether defendants had standing, or had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the hood area, to begin with. 
According to Utah case law, the legitimate expectation of 
privacy test is a fact sensitive and not a bright line test. State 
v. Grueber. 776 P.2d 70 (Utah App. 1989). In State v. Taylor, 169 
Utah Adv. Rep. 62 (Utah App. September 12, 1991), it was held that 
a defendant can have a legitimate expectation of privacy if he is 
the owner or is in possession of the property with the permission 
of the owner, and that "in order to be sufficient for fourth 
amendment purposes, a subjective expectation of privacy must be one 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." 
In this case, defendants admitted they were not the owners of 
the vehicle, could produce no registration for it, and could not 
produce evidence that permission had been given to them by the true 
owner to use the car. All they could say is that "Bill", about 
whom they could give no details, had loaned them the car. The only 
circumstance implying permissive use of the car was that they were 
in possession of the car. This is not sufficient to establish a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Furthermore, even if defendants had such an expectation in the 
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passenger compartment of the vehicle, they most likely did not have 
a subjective expectation of privacy in the area under the hood of 
the vehicle. Pursuant to Taylor, this is certainly not an 
expectation that society would recognize as reasonable, when they 
were not the owners of the vehicle and have not established that 
they had the permission of the true owner to use the vehicle. 
Dated at Provo, Utah this / H day of January, 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
^GEORGE F. BALLIF, JUDGE 
cc: Donald J. Eyre, Jr. 
W. Andrew McCullough 
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